How can subjective experience be accounted for in physical or computational systems?

The question demands a causal generative mechanism for WHY phenomenal experience arises in physical systems. NPS as formulated does the opposite: Lyre's program "deliberately does NOT solve the hard problem; it brackets it," targeting only the structure/content of experience (why this red relates to that orange) via a homomorphic mapping, while staying agnostic about what makes a state conscious at all. Fink's "direct" variant explicitly "delivers explanations but does not close the explanatory gap" — its author concedes the gap remains open. The core move is structural CORRESPONDENCE (a homomorphism between neural and phenomenal structure, a shared "common currency"), which is a mapping/redescription, not a derivation of phenomenality from physics. Even Northoff's bolder TTC, the only piece that reaches for qualia, is framed as "bridging" rather than "deductively generating phenomenality from physics," so the generative "why is there something it is like" is addressed "only by structural correspondence, not full derivation."

Key evidence: The theory's own characterization states NPS "deliberately does NOT solve the hard problem; it brackets it," and Fink concedes his variant "delivers explanations but does not close the explanatory gap" (Fink 2024; Lyre 2022).

DIT is explicitly a theory of the cellular/neural mechanisms (correlates) of conscious processing, not of phenomenal experience itself. Its proponents (Bachmann, Suzuki & Aru 2020; Aru, Suzuki & Larkum 2020) frame the target as the integrative biophysics of L5 pyramidal neurons — apical-somatic coupling gated by non-specific thalamus — which identifies WHERE and WHEN consciousness occurs, not WHY any of this gives rise to subjective experience. The theory even acknowledges that the coupling is the substrate on which conscious contents are realized but does not claim it explains why that substrate feels like anything. This identifies an enabling/correlative condition rather than offering a causal generative mechanism for the hard problem, which is exactly the failure mode the yes-bar excludes.

Key evidence: The theory's own statement that DIT "does NOT attempt to solve the hard problem or explain how subjective qualia arise from physical matter" and is "essentially silent" on the generative step from physics to felt experience (Bachmann, Suzuki & Aru 2020).

PCT's core machinery — comparison of perceptual signals to references, error reduction, and reorganization — is explicitly specified by its proponents to "operate without any requirement for awareness or consciousness," and its term "perception" denotes a neural signal magnitude, not subjective experience. The only generative phenomenal claim, Mansell's (2022) proposal that "primary consciousness emerges from this [reorganization] system," is an emergence/identity assertion that locates WHERE/WHEN phenomenality appears without explaining WHY an error-reducing feedback process should feel like anything. This is precisely the move the yes-bar excludes: a correlate or condition standing in for a causal generative mechanism. The theory does not engage the hard problem (its own abstract does not mention it), and even concedes ambiguity over whether consciousness is causally efficacious or epiphenomenal given the loops run without it.

Key evidence: Mansell (2022, Psychological Review) asserts "primary consciousness emerges from this [reorganization] system" while PCT's foundational commitment (Powers; IAPCT) is that control, perception, comparison, and reorganization "can operate without any requirement for awareness or consciousness."

HOT theory's actual mechanism is a metacognitive relation: a first-order state becomes conscious when it is the non-inferential target of an occurrent higher-order thought "I am in state M." This specifies WHICH states are conscious and under what relational condition, but it does not supply a causal generative account of WHY representing a state higher-order-wise produces felt subjective quality rather than mere unfelt representation. Rosenthal's project is explicitly reductive-redescriptive in representational terms, and even HOROR/empty-HOT variants treat the phenomenal character as just being the higher-order representational content, which restates rather than explains the gap. The theory's own listed limitations concede Block's "rock/explanatory gap" charge that merely representing a state cannot explain why it feels like anything, so by the strict hard-problem-honest bar it does not engage the generative WHY.

Key evidence: The Block (2011) "higher-order approach is defunct" objection, acknowledged in the theory's own limitations, that merely representing a first-order state as occurring "cannot explain why it feels like anything" — i.e., HOT redescribes rather than solves the hard problem.

Question 1 asks for a causal generative mechanism for WHY phenomenal experience arises in a physical system — engagement with the hard problem. AST, by its proponents' own explicit commitment, declines this: Graziano states the theory "emphatically does not explain how we have a subjective experience. It explains how a machine claims to have a subjective experience, and how it is that the machine cannot tell the difference." AST is a meta-explanation/dissolution of the hard problem (illusionism): it explains why a system REPORTS phenomenality (it introspects a simplified, mechanistically incomplete attention schema that depicts awareness as non-physical), not why there is something it is like to be that system. Under the strict standard, explaining the report while presupposing there is no extra phenomenal ingredient to generate is precisely a NO — it identifies the information state described as experience without giving a generative mechanism for experience itself.

Key evidence: Graziano's explicit statement (Graziano & Webb 2015; Graziano 2013) that AST "emphatically does not explain how we have a subjective experience. It explains how a machine claims to have a subjective experience, and how it is that the machine cannot tell the difference."

Irruption Theory is explicitly and deliberately agnostic on the generative hard problem. Froese argues "we should not expect an intelligible entailment from matter to consciousness in the first place" and treats the mind-matter link as an irreducible black box, quantifiable only indirectly via entropy. The theory reframes the hard problem as the "hard problem of agential efficacy" (how motivation makes a material difference) rather than tackling phenomenal generation at all. Even its "absorption" construct, which associates qualia with low-dimensional compression of neural activity, is conceded by Froese to be unable to explain WHY compression feels like anything, with that account deferred to future work. This is the textbook case the yes-bar excludes: identifying correlates/conditions while declining to provide a causal generative mechanism for why experience arises.

Key evidence: Froese (2024, "Irruption and Absorption," PMC11049376) explicitly declares mind-matter entailment "unintelligible" — a black box — and concedes the compression/binding account cannot explain why it feels like anything, deferring the experiential dimension to future work.

Orch OR specifies in great detail WHEN and WHERE conscious moments occur (orchestrated objective-reduction events in microtubules crossing the gravitational E_G threshold at τ ≈ ℏ/E_G, recurring ~40 Hz), but it does not derive WHY any such physical event is accompanied by felt experience. By its own formulation, phenomenal qualia are held to be "proto-conscious qualia intrinsic to spacetime geometry," merely "actualized" at each collapse — the felt-quality step is posited rather than derived. This is exactly the panpsychist-style positing the yes-bar excludes: experience is asserted as fundamental to spacetime, and OR collapse is the physical trigger that selects/accesses it, not an explanation of how physical dynamics generate subjectivity. There is no account of why gravitational self-collapse, as opposed to any other physical process, should feel like anything, nor why specific collapse configurations yield specific qualia. The theory thus identifies a candidate physical correlate and a collapse mechanism while leaving the hard problem solved by fiat.

Key evidence: The theory's own statement that "phenomenal experience is held to arise as proto-conscious qualia intrinsic to spacetime geometry, actualized at each orchestrated OR collapse; the felt-quality step is posited rather than derived" — and the listed limitation that "the hard problem is 'solved' by fiat — placing qualia in spacetime geometry — not by a derivation" (Hameroff & Penrose 2014).

RPT, as Lamme formulates it, supplies a neural sufficiency/identity condition (localized recurrent processing in sensory cortex, refined in 2018 to recurrence-induced Hebbian/NMDA plasticity) and explicitly adopts a "neural stance" that treats phenomenality as identical to a particular neural state. This identifies WHICH physical process is conscious, not WHY that process generates subjective experience. The theory provides no causal-generative bridge from recurrence/plasticity to felt quality; by its own account it dissolves or defers the explanatory gap rather than answering it. An identity claim that asserts "recurrent processing IS experience" is precisely the kind of correlate-standing-in-for-explanation the yes-bar excludes.

Key evidence: Lamme (2006, "Towards a true neural stance on consciousness") and Lamme (2018) frame RPT as redefining consciousness as a neural state, with the 2018 "missing ingredient" being recurrence-induced plasticity — a marker of when recurrence is conscious, not an explanation of why it feels like anything.

Question 1 demands a causal generative mechanism for WHY phenomenal experience arises in a physical system — i.e., engagement with the hard problem. PP/FEP explicitly declines this: its proponents (Hohwy, Seth) state that PP "is not itself a theory of consciousness" and substitute Seth's "real problem," which is a deliberate strategy to address easy-problem-like targets and hope the hard problem dissolves rather than confronting why inference is accompanied by felt quality. Its substantive positive claim — that conscious contents ARE the brain's stable, precision-weighted top-down predictions ("controlled hallucination") — is a content-identification and correlate-locating claim, identifying WHAT/WHEN consciousness tracks, not a derivation of WHY any prediction is experienced at all. Indeed PP lacks even a principled criterion distinguishing conscious from unconscious inference, since unconscious processes are also Bayesian/predictive, so prediction-error minimization is not shown to be sufficient for experience. Under the strict bar this leaves the explanatory gap unbridged.

Key evidence: Hohwy & Seth's explicit concession that PP "at the outset is not itself a theory of consciousness," paired with Seth's replacement of the hard problem with the "real problem" (Seth 2021, Being You; Hohwy & Seth 2020), constitutes a self-declared non-engagement with the asked-for generative mechanism.

GWT is, by its proponents' own framing, a theory of conscious ACCESS, not of phenomenal experience. Its mechanism — competition among unconscious processors, attentional selection, and all-or-none "ignition" broadcasting information to a global workspace — specifies WHEN and WHICH content becomes conscious and reportable, but provides no causal generative account of WHY global availability should feel like anything. Dehaene explicitly deflates the hard problem (treating the phenomenal residue as a "philosophical intuition" that will dissolve), and Baars approaches subjectivity operationally via contrastive analysis rather than explaining its origin. The substrate-independence claim actually sharpens the gap, since one could implement broadcasting with no felt experience. This is the textbook case of identifying functional correlates without engaging the generative question the YES-bar demands.

Key evidence: The theory's own statement that "GWT is explicitly a theory of ACCESS, not of phenomenal experience," and that it is acknowledged by its authors (Dehaene) to set aside or "deflate" the hard problem rather than solve it.

The YES-bar demands a causal generative mechanism explaining WHY subjective experience arises in a physical system. IIT, by its own proponents' formulation, does the opposite: it takes experience as the primary explanandum (the five axioms) and posits an IDENTITY — an experience IS the maximally irreducible cause-effect structure (Phi-structure) of a complex. An identity claim explains neither why integrated cause-effect power is accompanied by felt experience nor how it generates it; it stipulates that they are the same thing. The theory specifies WHEN/WHERE consciousness occurs (local maxima of integrated information) and HOW MUCH (Phi), but the question's HOW/WHY is answered by postulate, not mechanism. Critics noted in the description (and IIT's own framing of "inverting" the hard problem) confirm this restates rather than solves the explanatory gap.

Key evidence: IIT 4.0 (Albantakis et al. 2023) and the theory's own statement that it "posits an identity" between experience and the Phi-structure ("every property of an experience is accounted for in full by the physical properties of the Phi-structure") — an identity postulate, not a derivation of why experience arises.