The Seven Questions
These are the necessary conditions a theory of consciousness must meet. A complete theory should answer “Yes” to all seven; any “No” marks a gap that needs to be addressed. Open a question to see how each theory answers it.
- Q1Phenomena
How can subjective experience be accounted for in physical or computational systems?
The 'hard problem': why physical or computational processes give rise to subjective experience at all.
- Q2Self
Why does the subject of experience coincide with the initiator of action?
Why the 'I' that experiences is the same 'I' that acts — distinct from 'my body'.
- Q3Causation
Does consciousness have causal efficacy within a system, beyond mere correlations or predictability?
Mental causation without epiphenomenalism; true causation distinguished from correlation and mere predictability.
- Q4State
How can differences in levels or states of consciousness be explained?
e.g. wakefulness vs non-REM sleep or anesthesia, controlled by intrinsic mechanisms.
- Q5Function
What functional or cognitive roles are associated with consciousness?
e.g. semantic integration, association, and cognitive control — and why they depend on consciousness in biological systems.
- Q6Contents
How can the diversity, structure, and organization of conscious contents be explained?
e.g. the perceptual switches of binocular rivalry; integration, selection, and seriality of what reaches awareness.
- Q7Universality
Can the theory be applied across different types of systems, including artificial systems?
A requirement on the form of explanation — applicable wherever the relevant causal and functional structures are present, not a commitment to substrate-independence.